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Philip C. Stenning" Independence and the Director of
Public Prosecutions:The Marshall
Inquiry and Beyond1
The author describes the reforms to the prosecution system in Nova Scotia which
were recommended by the Marshall Inquiry in its 1989 report, and reviews the
extent to which they have been effectively implemented during the ensuing
decade. He concludes that many of the objectives originally identified by the
Marshall Inquiry in this respect have been substantially met, but that in some
areas there is still room for improvement. Finally, he notes the absence of
systematic evaluations of prosecutorial institutions and practices in Canadian
jurisdictions, and that because of this, it is difficult to say whether the Marshall
Inquiry's objectives might have been equally or more effectively met with less
radical (and probably less expensive) reforms.
L 'auteur d6crit les r6formes au systeme de poursuite de la Nouvelle-Ecosse que
la Commission royale d'enqu6te sur le cas Marshall avait recommand6es dans
son rapport de 1989 et examine dans quelle mesure ces reformes ont 6t6
effectivement mises en oeuvre dans la d6cennie qui a suivi. II conclut que bon
nombre des objectifs formul6s au d6part ont 6t6 en grande partie atteint, mais
qu'a certains 6gards, ily a encore matiere a am6lioration. Enfin, I'auteur souligne
I'absence d'une 6valuation syst6matique des institutions et des pratiques de la
poursuite dans les diverses juridictions canadiennes de sorte qu'il est difficile de
d6terminer si les objectifs de la Commission royale d'enqu6te auraient pu 6tre
atteints tout aussi bien ou plus efficacement par le biais de r6formes moins
radicales (et vraisemblablement moins coiteuses).
* Philip C. Stenning, Associate Professor, Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto
<p.stenning@utoronto.ca>.
1. This paper is based on a presentation at a Symposium in honour of the Honourable T.
Alexander Hickman, retired Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Newfoundland, Trial Division,
held at the Hotel Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland, on 17 November, 2000. I thank
the organizers of the symposium for permission to publish the paper.
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Introduction
The establishment ten years ago of the current office of Director of
Public Prosecutions (DPP) and Public Prosecution Service (PPS) in Nova
Scotia has been one of the most significant, if not the most significant,
legacy of the Marshall Inquiry ,2 which was chaired by then Chief Justice
Hickman of Newfoundland.' As is well known, the "independent",
statutory office of Director of Public Prosecutions established in Nova
Scotia remains unique in Canada, and its first ten years of life are
consequently the subject of interest and curiosity among those concerned
with the question of how the prosecutorial function can best be organized
in the public interest.
In this paper, I review the experiences of the DPP and PPS in meeting
the challenge of maintaining independence and public confidence in the
administration of criminal justice in Nova Scotia during the first decade
of their existence. Specifically, I attempt the rather audacious task of
assessing to what extent these new institutions can be considered to have
been successful in fulfilling the hopes which were voiced for them at the
time of their creation ten years ago, and ask what principal benefits might
be attributed to this unique Canadian prosecutorial experiment.
I. The Marshall Inquiry
In its final report, the Marshall Inquiry was highly critical of almost every
element in the Nova Scotia criminal justice system at the time, but
focused particular disapprobation on the Attorneys General and members
of the Attorney General's Department in their handling of prosecutorial
matters. Specifically, the Inquiry identified four principal problems in
this area: first, Attorneys General themselves were found to have
inadequately understood their proper role in prosecutorial decision
making. In particular, they did not understand their responsibility to avoid
any personal involvement (or acquiescence) in decision making in
particular cases which might reasonably raise suspicions either of improper
2. Although the Nova Scotia government's initiative in establishing these institutions began
before the Marshall Inquiry submitted its final report ( the government advertised for a
"Director of Public Prosecutions" in the Summer of 1989, 6 months before the Marshall
Inquiry's report was published), it was readily acknowledged by everyone at the time that it
was the Inquiry which had inspired, and substantially influenced the content of, this reform
initiative (see e.g. the 2nd Reading debate on Bill 72 - Nova Scotia Legislative Assembly
Debates, Thursday 7th June, 1990, 4355-73).
3. The other Commissioners were Associate Chief Justice Lawrence Poitras (Quebec), and
the Hon. Mr. Gregory Evans, Q.C. (a former Chief Justice of the Ontario High Court).
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partisanship or bias. A related problem was that they demonstrated an
unwillingness to fulfill their prosecutorial responsibilities in what may be
termed "high profile" or "sensitive" cases. Secondly, officials, including
very senior ones, in the Attorney General's Department were found to
have been applying inappropriate double standards in their prosecutorial
decision making. As the Inquiry put it, there was one standard for a poor
Indian, and another for influential fellow cabinet ministers, 4 who were
the subject of criminal investigations and prosecution.' Thirdly, the
Inquiry found that some of the legal advice provided by senior members
of the Department fell substantially below the standard of competence
which should be expected of such officers. And fourthly, the Inquiry
found that the conduct of Departmental officials did not reflect an
understanding of the proper relationship between the police and prosecutors
in criminal investigations and prosecutions.
To a great extent, the Inquiry characterized the problems collectively
as an indication of an insufficient independence in the prosecutorial
process and in the institutions charged with responsibility for prosecutorial
decision making. The independence from unacceptable partisan or personal
influence of almost all those involved in the process was considered to be
in question, as was the independence of the police from improper
pressures by prosecutorial authorities. As the Commissioners expressed
it in their report:
A full and clear understanding of the proper roles and relationships of and
between the Attorney General, Crown prosecutors and the police is
essential and fundamental to a fair system of justice. This understanding
must be coupled with a system which is organized and structured so as to
protect and enhance those proper relationships and which will, in so far as
possible, minimize the possibility that their integrity can be compromised
by any one individual.6
The Commissioners recognized that the existence of these several
problems gave rise to the most fundamental concern of all, which was a
loss of public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
4. In addition to investigating the circumstances of the Donald Marshal, Jr., prosecution, the
Commission investigated the circumstances of police and prosecutorial investigations and
decision making with respect to the activities of two Nova Scotia cabinet ministers, Roland
Thornhill and Billy Joe MacLean.
5. The Commissioners wrote that these weaknesses "are all the more serious because they are
not simply overt interference. They exhibit a deep-rooted and unwritten code that status is
important, and that one is not blind to influence in enforcing the law. Such an attitude makes
the ideal ofjustice for all meaningless, and renders the goal of complete public confidence in
the system of administration of justice impossible": Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on the
Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, Commissioners' Report, Vol. 1: Findings and
Recommendations (Halifax: Royal Commission, 1989) (hereinafter "Commissioners' Report")
at 211.
6. Ibid. at 211.
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prosecutorial system in the province.7 It was thus the restoration ofpublic
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the administration of
criminal justice to which the recommendations of the Commissioners
were essentially directed. All their specific recommendations, including
the call for greater independence in the administration of criminal justice,
were intended to contribute to this ultimate goal. Perhaps in light of this,
the challenge of establishing and maintaining independence in the
prosecution process may be thought of more fundamentally as the
challenge of maintaining public confidence in the administration of
criminal justice.
To this end, the Commissioners put forward two key prescriptions.
The first was:
In order to guarantee the maximum independence in prosecutorial deci-
sions, we believe it is vital that the Minister of the Crown responsible for
the administration of justice become involved in the disposition of indi-
vidual cases only in the most exceptional circumstances and that the nature
and extent of any such involvement be publicly recorded.'
The second was for the "creation of the office of an independent Director
of Public Prosecutions in Nova Scotia."9 The Commissioners stated their
belief that "the creation of such an office, similar to the one adopted in the
Commonwealth of Australia,' 0 will go a long way to restoring the
public's belief that their criminal justice system is being administered
properly and with fairness to all.""
7. The Commissioners wrote that the result of the handling of the Marshall, Thornhill and
MacLean cases had been "at best, public questioning of the system and, at worst, a loss of public
confidence in the integrity of the system itself. Ultimately, the integrity of the administration
ofjustice depends on the integrity, independence, character and professional competence of the
law officers of the Crown" (Ibid at 228-29).
8. The Commissioners added: "As a matter of principle, we do not believe it is appropriate for
the Attorney General to become involved in day-to-day decisions affecting individual cases,
but we recognize there will be exceptional circumstances in cases that raise public interest
issues with significant implications for the public at large. We believe that such considerations,
which are admittedly political in the broad sense of the word, are legitimate factors to be
weighed in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The important point, however, is that these
must be made public." (Ibid at 230). It is noteworthy, however, that these observations were
not incorporated as a formal recommendation.in the report. I suggest possible reasons for this
below.
9. Ibid.
10. The Commissioners' consultant on this topic, the late Professor John Edwards, in his
report to the Commissioners, had examined various versions of this office in a number of
differentjurisdictions in the Commonwealth, and recommended the Australian Commonwealth
model as the most appropriate for Nova Scotia: see in particular Parts II, III, V & VII of
Edwards, J. Walking the Tightrope of Justice - An Examination of the Office of Attorney
General in Canada with Particular Regard to its Relationships with the Police and Prosecutors
and the A rguments for Establishing a Statutorily Independent Director of Public Prosecutions
(Vol. 5 of the Marshall Inquiry Report).
11. Commissioners' Report, supra note 5 at 230.
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It is crucial to note here that the Commissioners recognized clearly that
"independence" of the prosecution system should not be achieved at the
expense of effective public accountability. "We reject," they wrote, "the
concept of a totally independent Director of Public Prosecutions (or
Attorney General), who would be accountable to no one except his or her
conscience and the law." Rather, "the challenge has been to find the
model that best reflects the right blend of independence and
accountability."' 2
The result was a set of recommendations for the establishment of an
office of Director of Public Prosecutions and a Crown Prosecution
Service with limited independence from the Attorney General. The
Attorney General, however, was to "continue to exercise the duties and
responsibilities traditionally accorded to that office in relation to the
administration of criminal justice", subject to specific accountability
requirements. These were: (1) to intervene in prosecutorial decision
making only after consultation with the DPP; (2) if such intervention was
contrary to the advice of the DPP, it must be in writing; (3) to make public
the nature and extent of any such interventions through publication in the
Gazette; (4) after consultation with the DPP, to issue guidelines for the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which were to be tabled in the
provincial legislature; and (5) to table the DPP's annual report in the
provincial legislature. 3 It is important to underscore these aspects of the
Marshall Inquiry's recommendations on this subject, as I believe they
have not always been as fully understood by members of the public, the
media, and critics of the present institutions in Nova Scotia as one might
wish.
In fairness to those 1 have just mentioned, however, it must be
acknowledged that the Inquiry Report was arguably less than sufficiently
precise about exactly what the limits to the independence of the new DPP
should be. In the first place, it was uncertain how it was to be determined
which cases are "cases that raise public interest issues with significant
implications for the public at large" (and therefore, in the Commissioners'
view, justify personal intervention by an Attorney General), or whose
determination of this issue should count (the AG? the DPP? the AG in
consultation with the DPP? the DPP in consultation with the AG?).
Secondly, assuming these issues are resolved, the Commissioners did not
give any indication as to what the nature of an AG's intervention in such
cases might appropriately be (giving advice to the DPP? reviewing the
DPP's proposed decisions with the possibility of overruling them?
12. Ibid at 229.
13. Recommendation 35(c) (Ibid. at 231).
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actually reserving the decisions to him- or herself? etc.), although clearly
the Commissioners' recommendations contemplated the possibility of
the DPP being "overruled" by the AG in a particular case. Furthermore,
the Commissioners' views on this critical issue, although they were
expressed in general terms in the text of their report, were not expressly
incorporated within their formal recommendation on the subject. Indeed,
the words "independent" and "independence" did not actually feature in
this recommendation at all.
14
The Public Prosecutions Act which was enacted by the Nova Scotia
legislature in the summer of 1990, represented the government's chief
legislative response to these two key prescriptions of the Marshall
Inquiry. 5 It is important to understand at the outset that this legislation
did not precisely implement the recommendations of the Marshall
Inquiry. Two matters in particular need to be noted in this respect. In the
first place, the Marshall Inquiry recommended that whenever an Attorney
General chose to intervene in a particular case, this should occur only
after consultation with the DPP, and should always be in writing and
eventually be made public through publication in the Gazette. These were
considered to be the most important safeguards against unnecessary and/
or inappropriate involvement of the Attorney General in prosecutorial
decision making in particular cases (and hence a guard against both the
fact and the perception of inappropriate political interference). Section
6(e) of the PPA, however, permits an Attorney General to personally
exercise his or her "statutory functions with respect to prosecutions" in
individual cases without any of these safeguards except the requirement
for prior consultation with the DPP.1
6
14. See Recommendation 35 (Ibid at 230-31).
15. Public Prosecutions Act, S.N.S. 1990, c. 21 [hereinafter PPA]. The Attorney General at
the time, the Hon. Thomas Mclnnis, when introducing Bill 72 at 2nd Reading said: "I am
equally pleased to stand with this piece of legislation which was one of the recommendations
in the Marshall Commission Report, that we establish the position of Director of Public
Prosecutions" and commented that "the theme we were trying to put here.., is to try to build
in as much independence as we could" (Nova Scotia Legislative Assembly Debates, Thursday
7th June, 1990, pp. 4355 and 4356).
16. The Hon. Fred Kaufman, Q.C., in his 1999 review of the Public Prosecution Service,
recommended that paragraph 6(e) should be amended to include a publication requirement
(and by implication, presumably, a requirement that decisions be in writing): see Kaufman, F.
Review of the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service-Final Report (Halifax: Government
Printer, 1999) at 12 and 415. It is noteworthy in this connection that paragraph 6(b) the PPA
does not restrict the other limitations to circumstances in which the AG decides to intervene
in a prosecution "contrary to the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions", as the Marshall
Inquiry's recommendation had proposed, and thus in this respect imposes wider limitations on
the AG's exercise of discretion than those proposed by the Inquiry.
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Secondly, the Marshall Inquiry's suggestion that an Attorney General
should only intervene personally in individual cases in "exceptional
circumstances in cases that raise public interest issues with significant
implications for the public at large" was not reflected in any of the
provisions of the PPA. One can only speculate as to why this was. But the
fact that this suggestion was not included in the Inquiry's formal
recommendation on this subject may well have been a factor, as may the
fact that fashioning legislative language to express such a vaguely
defined limitation on an Attorney General's discretion may have proven
too great a challenge. In addition, it is possible there may have been legal
advice that inclusion of such a limitation on an Attorney General's
constitutional authority with respect to the administration of justice
would be beyond the legislative competence of the provincial legislature.17
Whatever the reason, it is important to note that one of the Marshall
Inquiry's most significant suggestions for minimizing the risk of improper
political interference in the making of prosecutorial decisions was not
(and still is not) reflected in the legislation. From the important perspective
of public perception, the absence in the statute of any such substantive
limitation on the Attorney General's right to intervene in decision making
in individual cases may be quite significant, given the expectations on this
issue which the Marshall Inquiry report probably raised.
There was another equally important suggestion for enhancing the
independence of the prosecution process from undesirable partisan
political or personal influence which had been emphasized by the
Marshall Inquiry's consultant on this topic.'8 This was discussed in the
Commissioners' report (although again not expressly included in their
formal recommendation) and was reflected in the PPA. This was the
provision in s. 6(d) that the Attorney General "may consult with members
of the Executive Council regarding general prosecution policy but not
regarding a particular prosecution."
In most other respects, the legislation reflected closely the spirit and
content of the Marshall Inquiry's recommendations in this regard. As I
have tried to illustrate, however, the PPA, despite its express objective of
17. Although presumably, if correct, such advice ought also to have precluded the other
limitations on the exercise of such authority (the requirement to consult first, the requirement
that directions be in writing, and the requirement for subsequent publication in the Gazette)
which were included in the legislation. An argument as to the possible unconstitutionality of
such legislative restrictions had been put forward in neighbouring New Brunswick just as the
Marshall Inquiry was finalizing its report: see Office of the Attorney General of New
Brunswick, Proposal for Reform of the Machinery of Public Prosecutions (October 1989)
(Fredericton: Office of the Attorney General, Province of New Brunswick, 1989) at 18 and 33.
18. See Edwards, supra note 10 at 141-46.
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"providing for the independence of the Director of Public Prosecutions
and the public prosecution service", 19 in fact provided for a rather more
circumscribed independence for these institutions than the Marshall
Inquiry had suggested they ought to enjoy. For this reason, it could not
reasonably be expected to establish the rather higher standard of
independence envisaged by the Commissioners in their report.
The Inquiry's objectives, which the Commissioners believed that the
establishment of a statutory office of Director of Public Prosecutions and
Public Prosecution Service would achieve, can thus be briefly summarized
as follows:
1. To restore public confidence in the administration of criminal
justice.
2. To ensure that prosecutorial decision making is equitable and is not
influenced by partisan considerations or considerations of personal
benefit.
3. To ensure that Attorneys General appreciate and fulfill their
independent constitutional responsibilities with respect to prosecutions
(i.e. intervene when appropriate, refrain from intervention when not
appropriate, and function as a conduit for effective public and legislative
accountability for prosecutorial decision making).
4. To ensure competence and professionalism in prosecutorial decision
making.
5. To ensure that the proper roles of police and prosecutors in
prosecutorial decision making are observed in practice.
The particular means which the Commissioners felt were appropriate
to achieve these objectives included:
1. The establishment of prosecutorial institutions with limited
independence from political direction and control.
2. Ensuring that prosecutorial decision making in individual cases is
not discussed in Cabinet.
3. Limiting intervention by the Attorney General in individual cases to
"exceptional circumstances in cases that raise public interest issues with
significant implications for the public at large".
4. Requiring that such interventions be made only after consultations
with the DPP and that, when contrary to the advice of the DPP, they be
in writing and be published in the Gazette.
5. Requiring regular consultation between the DPP and the AG
'concerning all aspects of public prosecution and the administration of
the prosecution service".
20
19. PPA, supra note 15, s. 2(c).
20. Commissioner's Report, supra note 5 at 230, para. (b) (ii) of recommendation 35.
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6. Preparation, by the AG after consultation with the DPP, of guide-
lines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion which are to be tabled in
the provincial legislature.
7. Providing the DPP with security of tenure comparable to that of a
judge.
8. Establishing a Public Prosecution Service all of whose prosecutors
would be under the direction of the DPP and accountable through him or her.
9. Establishing the independent right and responsibility of the police
to conduct criminal investigations and determine who should be charged
and for what offences, without undue pressure from prosecutorial
authorities.
10. Submission by the DPP to the AG of an annual report on the
activities of the PPS, a copy of which is to be tabled in the provincial
legislature.
In the remainder of this paper, I explore to what extent it can be said
that these means have been successfully implemented, and the objectives
successfully achieved, in Nova Scotia during the decade since the
Marshall Inquiry submitted its report. Before doing so, however, two
facts which will not be seriously disputed by anyone need to be noted.
First, the first ten years of these new prosecutorial institutions in Nova
Scotia have not been without controversy and difficulties. A number of
"high profile" cases (such as the Westray,2 Regan2 and Morrison
23
cases) have given rise to considerable public controversy, and in some
cases vociferous criticism of the prosecutorial authorities.24 In addition,
21. R. v. Curragh Inc. (1997), 5 C.R. (5th) 291 (S.C.C.). This case involved the prosecution
of the owners of the mine involved in the "Westray Mine Disaster", in which several miners
lost their lives.
22. R. v. Regan (1999),21 C.R. (5th) 366 (N.S.S.C.) and (1999)28 C.R. (5th) 1 (N.S.C.A.).
This case involved the prosecution of a former Premier of Nova Scotia on a large number of
"historical" sexual assault and indecency charges.
23. R. v. Morrison (1998), 174 N.S.R. (2d) 201 (N.S.C.C.). This case involved a prosecution
of a Halifax doctor in connection with the death of one of her hospital patients.
24. See e.g. DeMont, J. "Justice under fire-Nova Scotia's prosecutors' office attracts
controversy", Maclean's, Vol 111, No. 51 (December 21st, 1998), pp. 22-23; and Cox, K.
"N.S. Crown under fire over Regan verdict", Globe and Mail, 16th January, 1999, p. A4. The
Prosecution Service was also the subject of some harsh criticisms from two members of the
Supreme Court of Canada in their dissenting opinion in the Westray case (R. v. Curragh Inc.
(supra note 21) at 326-327), as well as adverse comments by the trial judges in R. v. Corkum
(R.E.) (1998), 163 N.S.R. (2d) t97, at 20 t, and R. v. Regan (supra note 22) - this tastdecision,
however, was reversed by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal on appeal, and is currently on appeal
before the Supreme Court of Canada. In their subsequent review of the Westray prosecution
on behalf of the Kaufman Review (see note 16, supra.), M. Duncan Beveridge, Q.C., and
Patrick Duncan, Q.C., argued that the criticisms of the two Supreme Court of Canada Justices
in R. v. Curragh Inc. were not warranted by the facts of the case: Beveridge, D. & P. Duncan,
Review of the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service - Report on the Westray Prosecution
(Halifax: March 2000 - publisher not indicated) Vol. 1, 270-72.
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these years have witnessed some substantial, and at times publicly
manifested, employment relations difficulties within the PPS itself.25
Secondly, and as a direct result of these controversies, the Office of the
Director of Public Prosecutions and the Public Prosecution Service in
Nova Scotia have already been the subject of two major reviews during
these ten years (by the former Premier of Prince Edward Island, the
Honourable Joseph Ghiz, and Bruce Archibald in 1994,26 and by the
Honourable Fred Kaufman in 1999-200027).
The very fact of these several controversies, and the two reviews which
were felt to be required in response to them, might be considered to be
enough evidence that the objective of restoring public confidence in the
administration of criminal justice in Nova Scotia has not yet been fully
achieved during these ten years, despite the reforms which were introduced
in 1990 and beyond. In this connection it is noteworthy that, in his report
on his review of the PPS in 1999, Kaufman commented that his interviews
with Crown Attorneys in Nova Scotia had "brought to mind the words of
Sir lain Glidewell, contained in his 1998 Report on the Crown Prosecution
Service of England and Wales (CPS),28 where he noted that the CPS 'has
the potential to become a lively, successful and esteemed part of the
justice system, but that, sadly, none of these adjectives apply to the
Service as a whole at present'." Kaufman added at the conclusion of his
report that he believed it was important that the PPS report on the
implementation of recommendations contained in his report which are
accepted, so as "to help restore public confidence".29
Such a sweeping generalization, however, while it needs to be noted,
hardly does justice to the real progress which can be seen to have been
made during the decade following the Marshall Inquiry's report. I
conclude this paper, then, by considering more specifically first the ten
"means" which the Marshall Inquiry proposed, and then the five primary
objectives which I have identified above.
25. On June 2, 1998, the national newspaper, The Globe and Mail, published a photograph
of Nova Scotia prosecutors picketing with placards outside the court house in Halifax (on A4).
26. Ghiz, J. & B. Archibald, Independence, Accountability and Management in the Nova
Scotia Public Prosecution Service: A Review and Evaluation (Halifax: Law School, Dalhousie
University, 1994).
27. Kaufman, 1999 (supra note 16), and Beveridge & Duncan, 2000, (supra note 24).
28. Glidewell, I. The Review of the Crown Prosecution Service-Report Cm. 3960 (London:
H.M.S.O., 1998).
29. See Kaufman, 1999, See Kaufman, 1999, supra note 16 at 2,27 and 69 [emphasis added].
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II. The Means
1. The establishment of prosecutorial institutions with limited
independence from political direction and control
The PPA certainly goes a long way to implementing this proposal,
although, as noted above, it provided for a rather more limited independence
than the Marshall Inquiry had recommended. Specifically, while the
Marshall Inquiry envisaged that the Attorney General could only intervene
in an individual prosecution in limited circumstances, and then only when
a number of different accountability protocols were observed, s.6(e) of
the statute preserves the Attorney General's right to intervene in any case
and to personally make prosecutorial decisions after consultation with the
DPP, without all the accountability safeguards which the Marshall
Inquiry report proposed. In his 1999 review, Fred Kaufman recommended
that the PPA be amended to bring it more into line with the original
recommendations of the Marshall Inquiry in this respect.3"
Both the Ghiz/Archibald and the Kaufman reviews, however,
recognized that in addition to the direct relationship between the DPP and
the Attorney General there are other, practical aspects of independence
which require attention. Thus, for instance, the Ghiz/Archibald review
suggested that the DPP should be given greater and more independent
control over the resources and personnel of his office, and that the budget
of the DPP's office should be determined more directly by an all-party
committee of the provincial legislature, rather than by the Attorney
General and Cabinet, and managed more independently by the DPP. It
also recommended that the offices and files of the DPP be physically
separated from those of the Department of Justice, to increase public
perceptions of the DPP' s independence from the Attorney General and
the Department of Justice.31 Many, but by no means all, of these
30. See supra note 16.
31. See Ghiz/Archibald, supra note 26, Recommendations 1-11 at 153-55.
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recommendations were subsequently implemented.32 Overall, there can
be little doubt that the DPP and PPS in Nova Scotia are today the most
theoretically and practically independent prosecutorial institutions in
Canada.
2. Ensuring that prosecutorial decision making in individual cases is
not discussed in Cabinet
S. 6(d) of the PPA expressly provides for this. Of course, whether it is
being observed in practice is something that cannot be known for sure at
this time, given current conventions with respect to the secrecy of cabinet
deliberations. However, I am aware of no clear indication that it is not, and
neither of the two formal reviews have suggested otherwise (although
they, of course, also did not have access to cabinet minutes).
3. Limiting intervention by the Attorney General in individual cases to
"exceptional circumstances in cases that raise public interest issues
with significant implications for the public at large"
As noted earlier, this was not included in the PPA. There is every
indication, however, that it has been observed in practice during the last
ten years. In particular, Kaufman commented in his report that: "My
inquiries indicate that since the passing of the Act there has been no
unwarranted interference by an Attorney General with the decision
making process of the DPP and the Service".33 In their review of the
Westray prosecution, Beveridge and Duncan suggested that the Attorney
General's involvement in that case should perhaps have been more
substantial than it actually was.34 The Kaufman review noted that the
AG's authority to issue instructions to the DPP in a particular case has not
32. See Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service, Response of the Public Prosecution Service
to the Recommendations of the GhizlArchibald Review and Evaluation, as of September 1,
1998 (Halifax: Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service, 1998 - reproduced as Appendix E (pp.
395-402) in Kaufman, 1999 (supra note 16). In particular, the recommendation for direct
control over the DPP's budget by an all-party committee of the legislature was rejected in
principle by the Attorney General of the day (see Gillis, W., "Notes for the Minister: Crown
Attorneys Annual Meeting, September 28, 1994", at 7-8, quoted in Stenning, P., "The
Independence and Accountability of the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions, and of the
Public Prosecution Service, In Nova Scotia" - prepared as a Background Paper for the Kaufman
review, and included as Appendix D (pp. 329-394) in Kaufman, 1999 (supra note 16) at 360-
61), while expressing agreement with what he took to be "its intended purpose: objective public
accountability and budget oversight".
33. See Kaufman, 1999 (supra note 16), at 13.
34. See Beveridge & Duncan, 2000, supra note 24 at 139-42. Such a suggestion is not
unprecedented in Nova Scotia; the Marshall Inquiry made a similar suggestion with respect to
the involvement of the Attorney General in the Thornhill case: see Commissioners' Report,
Vol. 1, p. 2 0 5 .
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so far been exercised. In the Morrison case, however, the AG, after
consultations with the DPP, and also after taking external advice,
35
publicly announced his decision not to intervene in the PPS's decision to
proceed with a prosecution of Dr. Morrison.
3 6
4. Requiring that such interventions be made only after consultations
with the DPP and that, when contrary to the advice of the DPP, they
be in writing and be published in the Gazette
S. 6(a) and (b) of the PPA now require the Attorney General to consult
with the DPP before issuing either general instructions or guidelines with
respect to prosecutions, or specific instructions or guidelines with respect
to any particular prosecution. The Act also provides that any such
guidelines or instructions must be in writing and eventually be published
in the Gazette. The qualification suggested by the Marshall Inquiry, that
instructions or guidelines should only be in writing and published in the
Gazette if they are "contrary to the advice of the DPP", was not adopted
in the PPA. Paragragh 6(e), however, contemplates various kinds of
intervention in particular cases by an Attorney General without the last
two of these public accountability safeguards. While he did not find any
evidence suggesting that the Attorney General's discretion under paragraph
6(e) had in any way been abused, Mr. Kaufman, in his 1999 review,
recommended that the Act be amended to eliminate this "anomaly".37
35. See Archibald, B. An Opinion preparedfor the Attorney General and Minister of Justice
of the Province of Nova Scotia, the Honourable Dr. Jim Smith, in relation to the prosecution
of Dr. Nancy Morrison (Halifax: Dalhousie University Law School, 1998). This opinion is
discussed in some detail in the Background Paper on "The Independence and Accountability
of the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions, and of the Public Prosecution Service, in Nova
Scotia", which I prepared for the Kaufman Inquiry, and which is reproduced as Appendix D
of his report (Kaufman, 1999, supra note 16 - see in particular 351-55).
36. See Smith, J. "Statement of the Honourable Jim Smith, M.D., Minister of Health, Minister
of Justice and Attorney General - R. vs Dr. Nancy Morrison" Halifax, Province House, 2nd
July, 1998, in which the Attorney General reflected more generally on his role in the
prosecution process.
37. Kaufman, 1999, supra note 16 at 12. In its response to the Kaufman report, the
Government of Nova Scotia did not comment specifically on this recommendation, although
it did state that it "accepts the recommendations of the review" and "commits to implementing
the recommendations within the purview of the Government" (see Government of Nova
Scotia, Response to Kaufman Report, June 1999 at 1).
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5. Requiring regular consultation between the DPP and the AG
"concerning all aspects of public prosecution and the administration
of the prosecution service"
Again, this proposal was incorporated in s. 6(c), but as an option rather
than a requirement. 8 In his review, Kaufman noted that practice in this
regard had been inconsistent, and recommended that the PPA be amended
to "require that not less than once a month meetings be held between the
Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions to discuss
policy matters, as well as existing and contemplated major prosecutions".3 9
In its response to Kaufman's report, the Government of Nova Scotia,
commenting that "the relationship between the Attorney General and the
DPP is much too important to be left to the discretion of individuals",
indicated that the PPA would be amended "to include the requirement for
meetings not less than once a month between the Attorney General and
the DPP. ° At the time of writing, however, no such amendment has been
introduced.
6. Preparation, by the AG after consultation with the DPP, of
guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion which are to be
tabled in the provincial legislature
This was incorporated in s. 6(a) of the Act, but again as an option rather
than a requirement. Kaufman noted in his review that "six policy-oriented
written instructions were issued between 1992 and 1997, none of them
controversial."
41
7. Providing the DPP with security of tenure comparable to that of a
judge
Section 5 of the PPA provides for the security of tenure of the DPP. It
provides that the DPP holds office "during good behaviour", has the
status of "deputy head", shall be paid the same salary as the Chief Judge
of the provincial court, and can only be removed from office "for cause
by a resolution of the Assembly." During the ten years since the Act was
passed, two people have held the office of DPP. Both resigned after
38. The Marshall Inquiry had recommended that such "regular consultation" be one of the
"duties and responsibilities" of the DPP (see Commissioners' Report, 1989: Vol. 1, p. 230,
Recommendatiirn 35, pasa. (b) (ii) - supra note 5). The GhizAichibald Report (1994 - supra
note 26) recommended "setting up a specific protocol through which the Attorney General can
request information about individual cases, and having that request directed through the
D.P.P." (122).
39. Kaufman, 1999, supra note 16 at 14.
40. Government of Nova Scotia, supra note 37 at 3.
41. Kaufman, 1999, supra note 16 at 13. The six policies are referenced in a footnote to this
comment.
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relatively short terms of service, and for the last few years the office has
not been filled by a permanent appointee but by a senior prosecutor
serving as an Acting DPP. In his Interim Report submitted to the Attorney
General in late 1998, Kaufman emphasized his view that "it is of great
importance to have a new DPP in place as quickly as possible ... above
all, [to] provide the [Crown Prosecution] Service with strong leadership."
42
No such appointment has yet been made.
8. Establishing a Public Prosecution Service all of whose prosecutors
would be under the direction of the DPP and accountable through him
or her
The PPA, in particular ss. 4 and 7-15, provides for the establishment of
such a service, and it has been established. While both the Ghiz/Archibald
Report in 1994 and the Kaufman Review Report in 1999 recommended
various improvements to the internal management and administration of
the Crown Prosecution Service and its relationships with other parts of the
provincial government, neither recommended any major structural changes
to the Service as established pursuant to the PPA. In the conclusion to his
Final Report, Kaufman commented that, subject to the suggestions he had
made, "the Act is sound and provides a good framework for the Service".
43
9. Establishing the independent right and responsibility of the police
to conduct criminal investigations and determine who should be
charged and for what offences, without undue pressure from
prosecutorial authorities
This right of the police seems now to be well recognized and observed in
Nova Scotia, and neither of the two reviews suggested otherwise. In fact,
Kaufman noted in his review that one Chief of Police had commented to
him that "Independence has taken on a life of its own" to the point that
there was evidence that police were engaging in inappropriate "Crown-
shopping" in order to obtain the prosecutorial advice they wanted-a
practice which Mr. Kaufman urged should be ended.44 The trial judge in
the Regan case, however, stayed half of the charges as an abuse of process
on the ground, inter alia, that by interviewing complainants in the
company of the police prior to the laying of charges, prosecutors had
compromised their own independentjudgment as well as the independence
of the police in deciding what charges should be laid. Since this decision
was reversed on appeal and is now the subject of a further appeal to the
42. The Hon. Fred Kaufman, Q.C., Interim Report to theAttorney General, December 1998 at 22.
43. Kaufman, 1999, supra note 16, at 69.
44. Kaufman, 1999, ibid., at 33-34.
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Supreme Court of Canada, it would be inappropriate to comment further
on it at this point, other than to suggest that the case indicates that the
appropriate division of responsibilities and "independence" of the police
and prosecutors in the prosecutorial process may not yet be adequately
clarified or always observed in Nova Scotia.
10. Submission by the DPP to the AG of an annual report on the
activities of the PPS, a copy of which is to be tabled in the provincial
legislature
An annual reporting requirement is provided for by s. 13 of the PPA,
which requires that the DPP report directly to the Legislative Assembly
rather than through the Attorney General.
III. The objectives
1. To restore public confidence in the administration of criminal
justice
As has already been suggested, there is considerable evidence that this
objective has not been fully achieved, despite the reforms and reviews
which have occurred. A major reason for this may well be an inadequate
public (and media) understanding of the prosecutorial system, of the
proper roles of the various players in it (especially the Attorney General),
and of the quite technical considerations which sometimes inevitably
impinge on prosecutorial decisions. With respect to the role of the
Attorney General in the prosecution process, the Marshall Inquiry may
have unwittingly generated unrealistic or inappropriate public
expectations. To some, the Commissioners' report may have been taken
to imply that an Attorney General's intervention in decisions about
particular cases could somehow be confined by law to "exceptional
circumstances in cases that raise public interest issues with significant
implications for the public at large." Their report, however, did not
actually indicate how this might be achieved or what kinds of cases might
properly be considered to fall within this rubric. This may have left an
erroneous impression with the public that any personal intervention in
prosecutorial decision making by an Attorney General should be regarded
as inherently suspect, making it difficult for Attorneys General to fulfill
their constitutional responsibilities in this respect without constantly
arousing public suspicion.
While such suspicion may be thought to be a healthy prophylactic
against abuses, if frequently aroused it probably is not conducive to
sustained public confidence in the prosecution system. Legislative and
administrative reforms should certainly not be expected, by themselves,
to achieve this broad objective. Recognizing this, Kaufman recommended
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in his report that "a significant public information campaign be under-
taken to educate the citizens of Nova Scotia about the role played by the
Public Prosecution Service in the administration of criminal justice." If
public confidence in the prosecution system and the administration of
justice in the province is to be fully restored, however, perhaps an even
more broadly framed public education initiative will be required, one
covering the proper role of the Attorney General and the proper relation-
ships between that officer and the Public Prosecution Service, as well as
with the other government ministers and cabinet. Such an approach
would ensure that these matters are not the subject of public discussion
and reflection only in the context of decision making with respect to "high
profile", controversial cases. As the late John Edwards, the unchallenged
expert on these matters in the common law world, once observed, anyone
who wants to improve public and media understanding of these matters
must find some way to confront the "vast body of public ignorance" about
them .
4 5
2. To ensure that prosecutorial decision making is equitable and is not
influenced by partisan considerations or considerations of personal
benefit
There is considerable evidence that this objective has largely been
achieved in Nova Scotia since the Marshall Inquiry submitted its report,
and that the reforms which have been put in place may have contributed
significantly to its enduring existence. Certainly neither of the reviews of
the PPS has identified any evidence that the problems which the Marshall
Inquiry identified in this regard have persisted. For obvious reasons,
however, it is difficult to find conclusive evidence, since such unacceptable
influence can be accomplished with relative public invisibility (e.g. the
secrecy of cabinet discussions). For reasons suggested with respect to the
preceding objective, the public perception of the absence of such
unacceptable influences may have been less successfully achieved than
the reality of it.
45. Edwards, J. "Emerging problems in defining the modem role of the office of Attorney
General in Commonwealth countries", reproduced in Edwards, J., Ministerial Responsibility
for National Security as it relates to the Offices of Prime Minister, Attorney General and
Solicitor General of Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1980) at 121.
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3. To ensure that Attorneys General appreciate and fulfill their
independent constitutional responsibilities with respect to
prosecutions (i.e. intervene when appropriate, refrain from
intervention when not appropriate, and function as a conduit for
effective public and legislative accountability for prosecutorial
decision making)
As noted throughout this paper, the achievement of this objective may be
hampered by the inadequate public understanding of the "proper" role of
the Attorney General in the prosecutorial process, and in particular the
desirable limits on his or her intervention in prosecutorial decisions in
individual cases. The discrepancy between the suggestions in the text of
the Marshall Inquiry report and the content of its formal recommendation
(and the provisions of the PPA) illustrates this lack of clarity. As a result,
the appropriate limits to an Attorney General's intervention in particular
cases appear still to be neither agreed upon nor well understood by the
public and the media. This situation may perhaps have led Attorneys
General to be overly reluctant to fulfill their responsibilities with respect
to intervention in some individual cases,46 and the public and the media
to be overly suspicious of any such involvement by an Attorney General.
On the other hand, it can readily be acknowledged that these shortcomings
may be preferable to their opposites, as revealed by the Marshall Inquiry's
report.
4. To ensure competence and professionalism in prosecutorial
decision making
The evidence, particularly that of the Ghiz/Archibald and Kaufman
reviews, indicates that while great strides have been made towards the
achievement of this objective, and while the reforms which have been
introduced have contributed significantly to this progress, at the end of
the first decade of the DPP and PPS there remains some way to go. A
major factor identified by both reports in this respect has been the failure,
during the last decade in Nova Scotia, adequately to resolve festering
grievances of prosecutors over remuneration, resources and working
conditions, and the associated low morale which these have engendered.
The absence of continuous, strong leadership of the Public Prosecution
Service was also identified as an important contributing factor by
Kaufman in his report. In its response to Kaufman, the Government of
Nova Scotia committed itself to addressing these issues and outlined the
steps which it had already taken to do so, promising legislative amendments
46. See in particular the comments of Beveridge & Duncan, referred to in note 24, supra.
Independence and the Director of Public Prosecutions: 403
The Marshall Inquiry and Beyond
recommended by Kaufman if these proved insufficient.47 So far, how-
ever, a permanent appointment to the office of Director of Public
Prosecutions has not been made, and promised legislative amendments
have not been introduced.
5. To ensure that the proper roles of police and prosecutors in
prosecutorial decision making are observed in practice
The evidence suggests that this objective has been substantially achieved
in Nova Scotia, although the Regan case indicates that uncertainties
remain as to the proper relationship between police and prosecutors
which need to be authoritatively resolved. It is to be hoped that the
forthcoming decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Regan case
will make a valuable contribution to the achievement of this objective.
Conclusion
The available evidence suggests that the reforms to the prosecution
system in Nova Scotia introduced after (and largely inspired by) the
Marshall Inquiry report have been substantially, but not fully, successful
in achieving the objectives which they were intended to achieve, although
substantial progress remains to be made with respect to some of these.
The conclusion is inescapable, in this author's view, that despite any
outstanding shortcomings in the administration of criminal justice in
Nova Scotia, the Marshall Inquiry report has contributed very significantly
to the improvement of the administration of criminal justice (at least as
far as criminal investigation and prosecutions are concerned) in that
province. Moreover, because of its status as a landmark document in this
respect, it will stand as one of the most significant contributions to the
quality of the administration of criminal justice, not just in Nova Scotia,
but in Canada more generally.
Two questions inevitably remain, however. Were the kinds of problems
which the Marshall Inquiry brought to light in the prosecution system of
Nova Scotia in any way unique to thatjurisdiction? And even if they were,
could they have been addressed and resolved without the adoption of a
new office of an "independent" Director of Public Prosecutions and
Public Prosecution Service, such as have been developed in Nova Scotia
during the last ten years?
Both questions are difficult to answer with any confidence. No other
provincial prosecutorial system has been subjected to the kind of scrutiny
the Nova Scotia system experienced at the hands of the Marshall Inquiry.
Despite this, similarly serious questions about the integrity and competence
47. See Government of Nova Scotia, supra note 37 at 4-7.
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of criminal investigations and prosecutions have been raised in numerous
less comprehensive investigations in other provinces. The Owen Report
in British Columbia,48 the Hughes Report49 (on prosecutorial decision
making with respect to Mount Cashel) in Newfoundland (which ironically
found itself looking into the role of Alex Hickman during his days as
Attorney General there), the Kaufman Inquiry into the Guy Paul Morin
case in Ontario," the investigations into the prosecution of David
Milgaard in Saskatchewan," the Manitoba Inquiry52 (examining the
treatment of native people in general in the criminal justice system there,
and the investigation and prosecution of suspects in the Helen Betty
Osborne case in particular), the Cawsey Inquiry in Alberta53 (examining
the experiences of native people in the criminal justice system of that
province), the Indian Justice Review Committee report in Saskatchewan
4
(a similar undertaking in that province), and the Commission on Systemic
Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System5 5 have all raised questions
similar to those which surfaced during the Marshall Inquiry. They all
suggest that these issues were not unique to Nova Scotia. What has not
been undertaken so far, however-and what would surely merit extended
consideration in another article-is any kind of systematic comparative
review of the various solutions to the problems identified by these
disparate investigations, and the evidence as to how successful they have
been in satisfactorily and enduringly resolving those problems.
There is an unfortunate tendency to assume that once an inquiry has
been held and has submitted its report and recommendations, and a
government has publicly adopted such recommendations, problems can
be considered solved. Yet the evidence which I have reviewed with
respect to the experience in Nova Scotia during the last ten years indicates
that such an assumption may not be fully justified. There were certainly
48. Owen, S., Discretion to Prosecute Inquiry-Commissioner's Report (Vancouver: Prov-
ince of British Columbia, 1990).
49. Newfoundland & Labrador, Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Response of the
Newfoundland Criminal Justice System to Complaints (The Hon. S.H.S. Hughes, Q.C.,
Commissioner) Report (St. John's, Queen's Printer, 1991).
50. Ontario, Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin (The Hon. Fred
Kaufman, C.M., Q.C., Chair) Report (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1998).
51. Reference Re Milgaard, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 875.
52. Manitoba, Public Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People,
Report: Vol. 1: The Justice System and Aboriginal People (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1991)
53. Alberta, Task Force on the CriminalJustice System and its Impact on the Indian and Metis
People of Alberta, Report: Justice on Trial (Edmonton: Government Printer, 1991)
54. Saskatchewan, Indian Justice Review Committee, Report (Regina: Government Printer,
1992).
55. Ontario, Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, Report
(Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1995).
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those, including this author, who, at the time the Marshall Inquiry's
recommendations were being finalized, argued that the creation of an
independent Director of Public Prosecutions and Public Prosecution
Service might not be the best way to address the problems raised by the
Inquiry, and that it might well not be successful in that respect. Indeed,
one opponent of the concept argued that the "independence" of the office,
as advocated by the Marshall Inquiry, would generate more problems of
public accountability than it solved, and that improving the quality and
training of the personnel in the existing system, and enhancing the
transparency of its decisions, would achieve the desired results just as
effectively, at considerably less expense, and with greater respect for
democratic constitutional principles. 6
Whether these arguments are persuasive or not-and in this author's
view, the evidence from Nova Scotia reviewed in this article, as well as
recent experiences in some other provinces, do lend some support to
them-it may well be that what made the proposal for an independent
DPP and PPS so attractive to its proponents in Nova Scotia was its
symbolic, rather than just its more purely instrumental, appeal in restoring
public confidence in the system. Symbolically, the creation of these
institutions signalled a clean break from the tainted past and a clear
distancing of prosecutorial decision making from unwanted political
influence-two objectives which were much sought after in Nova Scotia
at the beginning of the 1990s, but perhaps not quite so prominent in the
minds of the public in other provinces at the time. However, persuasive
evidence as to how effectively the new institutions in Nova Scotia have
achieved these objectives, or whether they could just as effectively have
been achieved through other means, remains tantalizingly elusive.
56. See in particular the comments of Mr. Serge Kuzawa, Q.C., a provincial prosecutor in
Saskatchewan, in Vol. 7 of the Marshall Inquiry's Report, Consultative Conference, November
24-26, 1988 - Edited Transcript of Proceedings (Halifax: Royal Commission, 1989), at
115-18, and those of this author, at 119 of the same volume. Ironically, Mr. Kuzawa's role in
the prosecution of David Milgaard was to come under critical scrutiny a few years later.
